While the $ZRC of Zircuit is officially TGE

Taking advantage of the official TGE of Zircuit’s $ZRC, let’s talk about an interesting mechanism in this project regarding the sequencer.

Zircuit has its own L2, which is characterized by creating a solution called “Sequencer Level Security / SLS”.

We all know that the import and export of transactions in L2 are currently done through the official sequencer of the project party. Of course, due to the existence of ZK/rollups, we are generally not worried about the sequencer acting maliciously.

Overall, the sorter is a neutral role, always executing each transaction justly and impartially.

So, even though the sorter is neutral, can we make an effort to let it join the camp of kindness?

So, Zircuit has implemented this SLS mechanism, which is designed to isolate “malicious transactions”.

Normally, how does an L2 transaction get onto the chain? It’s a simple four-step process:

1. The user initiates the transaction and broadcasts it.

2. Transaction to memory pool (mempool) waiting

3. As a neutral camp, the sorter helps pack it into the Block.

4. Trading on-chain

However, based on the SLS mechanism, this step has become five steps:

1. The user initiates the transaction and broadcasts it.

2. Transaction to memory pool (mempool) waiting

3. If there is no malicious intent, help it package into the Block.

4. Transaction on the chain

But what if there is suspected malicious trading? The change starts from step four:

4. If suspected of maliciousness, enter the isolation pool

5. The isolation pool review is correct, and the sorter continues to help it pack.

Or:

4. If suspected of maliciousness, enter the isolation pool

5. If the review of the isolation pool confirms that it is indeed a malicious transaction, then refuse to package it on the chain.

The standard for checking whether SLS is malicious may use some Open Source libraries and AI assistance for judgment.

There is hope to achieve some effects in the future, for example: stolen assets may never be transferred or cross back to L1. This is still very meaningful for the current harsh on-chain environment of the dark forest.

Of course, since it is a transaction inspection, it is inevitable that there may be some false positives. However, I understand that by improving the Algorithm of the isolation pool, it can effectively drop such issues as much as possible.

This is a double-edged sword. Blockchain emphasizes permissionless, which is slightly contrary to SLS. From the perspective of ordinary users, such L2 is indeed safer.

But overall, I feel that although there is a slight impact on permissionless, the increase in security, especially in protecting inexperienced users, is still worthwhile.

At the end, please find: the original paper on Zircuit’s SLS mechanism: