#钱包安全威胁 After reviewing the security data of plugin wallets following the Trust Wallet 2.68 version vulnerability incident, the conclusion is: large-scale failures caused directly by official vulnerabilities are actually not very frequent.
The $6 million theft is indeed eye-catching, but when looking over a longer timeline, the losses caused by core code vulnerabilities in mainstream products like MetaMask, Phantom, Rabby, etc., are far lower than the destructive power of counterfeit software and phishing. Data from Chainalysis in 2025 clearly illustrates this—an abnormal surge in MetaMask user theft incidents, with the root cause not in the plugin itself but in malicious extensions.
This highlights two realities:
First, risk distribution is uneven. The plugin wallet market is highly concentrated (Trust Wallet accounts for 35%), and a large user base (17 million monthly active users) ironically makes it a prime target for hackers. The cost of imitation is low, and the returns are high, making it more economical than exploiting official vulnerabilities.
Second, defense strategies need adjustment. Waiting for official patches is less effective than proactively cutting off counterfeit entry points—this line of defense via the official Chrome Web Store can solve 80% of the issues. On the user side, habits should be cultivated: avoid downloading from third-party channels, regularly verify plugin versions, and monitor abnormal wallet activities.
Ultimately, fund security still depends on the user. The responsibility boundaries of plugin product providers are clear, but protection vulnerabilities often lie on the user side.
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#钱包安全威胁 After reviewing the security data of plugin wallets following the Trust Wallet 2.68 version vulnerability incident, the conclusion is: large-scale failures caused directly by official vulnerabilities are actually not very frequent.
The $6 million theft is indeed eye-catching, but when looking over a longer timeline, the losses caused by core code vulnerabilities in mainstream products like MetaMask, Phantom, Rabby, etc., are far lower than the destructive power of counterfeit software and phishing. Data from Chainalysis in 2025 clearly illustrates this—an abnormal surge in MetaMask user theft incidents, with the root cause not in the plugin itself but in malicious extensions.
This highlights two realities:
First, risk distribution is uneven. The plugin wallet market is highly concentrated (Trust Wallet accounts for 35%), and a large user base (17 million monthly active users) ironically makes it a prime target for hackers. The cost of imitation is low, and the returns are high, making it more economical than exploiting official vulnerabilities.
Second, defense strategies need adjustment. Waiting for official patches is less effective than proactively cutting off counterfeit entry points—this line of defense via the official Chrome Web Store can solve 80% of the issues. On the user side, habits should be cultivated: avoid downloading from third-party channels, regularly verify plugin versions, and monitor abnormal wallet activities.
Ultimately, fund security still depends on the user. The responsibility boundaries of plugin product providers are clear, but protection vulnerabilities often lie on the user side.