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I just followed this case in Đồng Nai and found it quite concerning. Not only because of the 2,500 billion VND that was embezzled, but also because of how this entire network was reorganized. For the first time, the authorities caught the mastermind: a Vietnamese girl—Nguyễn Thị Vân (sinh 1996)—who personally invested in building the infrastructure and managed the entire scam system from Cambodia. This shows that scam models no longer just “follow” foreign patterns; they now involve initiative and well-organized operations right from Vietnamese people themselves.
The tactics are still familiar, but far more sophisticated. The perpetrators create female characters as overseas students, proactively befriend people, and build romantic relationships with guys who have solid financial means. After they manage to earn the victim’s trust, they lure the victim into “tasks”—placing orders on fake e-commerce platforms such as Ozon or Mercado. At first, the victim is refunded small amounts to create a sense of safety, but when the deposited money gradually increases, that’s when the perpetrators begin demanding additional fees for reasons like “system errors,” “upgrading the account,” “unlocking profits”… Then, in the end, they seize everything.
The truly noteworthy part is how they handle the cash flow. After scamming the money, we circulate it through many bank accounts; there are even ways to delete previously saved bank accounts to erase traces, and then convert it into USDT via Chinese intermediaries. This is a typical money-laundering model in recent times: fiat → intermediary accounts → stablecoins → cross-border transfers. This model is very difficult to trace.
Currently, the police have arrested 14 leading suspects (3, 11 accomplices), and seized assets worth more than 50 billion VND, including cars, land, gold, and nearly 300,000 USDT. However, another 111 other people whose identities have been determined are still being pursued.
But I want to share a few points from this case:
First, crypto is not the root cause of the scam, but it is being used as a money-transit tool because of its cross-border nature and fast transaction speed.
Second, the “online money-making tasks,” “refunded order placements,” and “high-profit investments” models are almost 100% traps if they require you to deposit money first.
Third, the psychological factor—building affection, creating trust—still remains the most dangerous weapon of these networks. That is why they choose the “love scam” method.
The crypto market is maturing, but at the same time, the sophistication of scam models is increasing. This story brings back one key point: abnormally high profits always come with extremely high risks, and when money is required to be transferred through USDT or any token at all, the chance of recovery is almost nonexistent once it has been stolen. If you’ve encountered similar models, please raise the alarm and share it so others can avoid the trap. Crypto is a neutral tool, but what determines everything is how it’s used.